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Abstract
Objectives To investigate patients’ and family members’ perceptions
and experiences of disclosure of healthcare incidents and to derive
principles of effective disclosure.
Design Retrospective qualitative study based on 100 semi-structured,
in depth interviews with patients and family members.
Setting Nationwide multisite survey across Australia.
Participants 39 patients and 80 family members who were involved in
high severity healthcare incidents (leading to death, permanent disability,
or long term harm) and incident disclosure. Recruitment was via national
newspapers (43%), health services where the incidents occurred (28%),
two internet marketing companies (27%), and consumer organisations
(2%).
Main outcome measures Participants’ recurrent experiences and
concerns expressed in interviews.
Results Most patients and family members felt that the health service
incident disclosure rarely met their needs and expectations. They
expected better preparation for incident disclosure, more shared dialogue
about what went wrong, more follow-up support, input into when the
time was ripe for closure, and more information about subsequent
improvement in process. This analysis provided the basis for the
formulation of a set of principles of effective incident disclosure.
ConclusionsDespite growing prominence of open disclosure, discussion
about healthcare incidents still falls short of patient and family member
expectations. Healthcare organisations and providers should strengthen
their efforts to meet patients’ (and family members’) needs and
expectations.
Introduction
Health providers in Western countries are adopting “open
disclosure” policies that promote the discussion of healthcare
incidents with patients.1-5 Studies using hypothetical designs
have suggested that a gap exists between clinicians’ and patients’
views of what is appropriate incident disclosure. Clinicians tend
to consider unexpected clinical outcomes as less serious and
therefore less in need of disclosure than do patients.6 Clinicians
also err on the side of caution, whereas patients expect openness
and admission of responsibility.7 Such breakdowns in the
disclosure process exacerbate the distress patients experience
from the event itself.
Surveys of clinicians’ and patients’ perceptions of open
disclosure policy and practices also reveal important barriers to
open communication with patients after healthcare incidents.6 8 9
Several studies have highlighted clinicians’ concerns about the
personal, professional, and legal consequences of disclosure.10
Clinicians are also concerned about the considerable time and
effort often required for incident disclosure,11 including
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managing relationships among practitioners and between
practitioners and patients; handling patients’ and family
members’ disappointment, fear, and anger; and justifying to all
stakeholders the approach taken and the outcomes produced
from disclosure.9 12 For their part, patients refer to the
considerable physical, emotional, and financial burden of
incidents causing harm13; the unacceptability of inadequate and
denied disclosure14; and the importance of provider responses
that are caring, honest, quick, personal, accessible, and
frequent.15 Some studies suggest that patients may have an
interest in extending disclosure discussions to encompass plans
for and evidence of practice improvement, with some
interviewees indicating interest in contributing to the monitoring
of improvement processes over time.9 14 16
However, few studies have measured the actual experiences of
patients and families with the disclosure process. The dearth of
in depth interviews may be due to multiple factors, including
health services’ reluctance to reveal the details of incidents and
disclosures; patients’ and families’ hesitation to revisit harmful
incidents; and the protracted and confidential nature of incident
investigations, complaints processes, and litigation proceedings
which can limit data gathering. Such interviews are critical,
however, if we are to garner robust evidence to support
clinicians in communicating well about incidents and avert the
possibility of ineffective disclosure prompting more complaints
and litigation.17 The present study was undertaken to produce
such evidence.
This Australian study was conducted at a time of progress in
the dissemination of disclosure policy and disclosure
communication training.11 12 Ministerial endorsement of open
disclosure policy in 2008 led to state level development of such
policy18 19 and requirements for evidence of engagement with
disclosure in local health services.20We sought to assess whether
these developments have translated into tangible benefits for
patients. The study had two objectives: to understand patients’
and relatives’ experiences of healthcare incidents and incident
disclosures since 2008, and to enrich open disclosure policy
with patients’ views of the principles of effective open
disclosure.
Methods
Study approach
We conducted in depth, semi-structured audio (and video)
recorded interviews. This approach had two distinct advantages:
it was best able to capture the full range of practical,
communicative, and emotional complexities associated with
incident disclosure, and it enabled repeated access to recordings
for the purpose of checking transcriptions.
Sample and recruitment
Interview participants were recruited over two phases.
Phase one
In the initial phase we recruited participants via participating
health services. This enabled the inclusion of participants who
were reported to have experienced a severe to very severe
healthcare incident (involving serious short term or permanent
harm or death) and undergone open disclosure between 2008
and 2010. This time frame ensured that interviewees would not
overlap with those interviewed for the 2006–8 evaluation of the
national open disclosure pilot,12 16 and that their incidents would
be handled under the aegis of the most recent, state issued
policies on open disclosure.
Participating health services identified potential interviewees
from hospital records who met the inclusion criteria (table 1);
they then forwarded an envelope to their address containing a
study participation request, information sheet, consent sheet,
and reply-paid envelope prepared by the research team.
Participants notified the health service of their interest in the
study, which then forwarded respondents’ contact details to the
research team.We conducted 28 interviews with 36 participants
recruited in this way for this first phase of the study (table 2).
Phase two
In the second phase of the study we recruited participants via
the national print media and internet research companies (table
1). This strategy ensured that the sample was not restricted to
health services vetting cases and participants, and that patients
and families had the opportunity to opt into the study directly.
National tabloid and broadsheet newspapers carried a 5×10 cm
advertisement asking for people’s stories about care gone wrong
(see web extra material on bmj.com). We contracted internet
research companies to distribute a brief online questionnaire to
attract interviewees from their lists of thousands of online
respondents. We also asked consumer organisations to gauge
interest in the study amongmembers by circulating study flyers
on their websites and at public forums.
The newspaper advertisement yielded 43 interviews with 56
participants, the online campaign yielded 27 interviews with 27
interviewees, and the consumer organisation recruitment yielded
two interviews with two participants. All incidents that were to
be the subject of the interviews were vetted by the project
coordinator for time of occurrence and severity. In total, 119
interviewees were invited to participate in 100 interviews (table
2).
Sample demographics
The healthcare incidents discussed involved patients ranging
from 4 days to 94 years old with an average age of 57 (fig 1).
Interviewees were from across Australia, but mostly from New
South Wales (43%; fig 2). Their incidents had occurred across
all clinical specialties, but mostly in medical (28%) and surgical
(24%) inpatient settings (fig 3).
Data collection
All interviewees were contacted by telephone before the
interview by the project coordinator to assess eligibility (based
on severity and date of occurrence of the incident), clarify
project information, obtain consent, and determine whether the
interview would be conducted face to face, audio or video
recorded, or over the telephone. Half of the interviews were
conducted face to face in participants’ homes. Interview duration
ranged from 20 minutes to three hours. All interviews were
audio recorded digitally, and 129 were video recorded.
Interviews were conducted by researchers with extensive
healthcare and communication experience to deal with the
sensitive and often clinical and technical nature of the subject.
Counselling supports were available to participants in the event
of any additional distress caused as a result of participating in
the study. This support was not requested or required at any
time during the study. One interviewee responded via email to
the interview schedule.
Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed verbatim, yielding over 3000
A4 pages of single spaced text. Transcripts were discourse
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analysed with identification of overarching theme domains,
cross thematic relationships, and thematic hierarchies.21 Three
researchers (RI, SA, and KB) analysed all the transcripts. Other
investigators analysed selected sets of transcripts for verification
of themes. Analyses were compared at regular meetings, and
differences in interpretation were negotiated until agreement
was reached. Because revisiting the interviews was considered
to be burdensome for patients and family members, validation
of the transcripts with them was not attempted.
After full verification, thematic domains were imported into
and managed in QSR NVivo (Qualitative Solutions and
Research, Version 9), a code-and-retrieve software package.
NVivo enabled cross linking and ranking of domains,
sub-domains, and relevant transcript quotes. The resulting
NVivo network of thematic nodes, cross links, and hierarchies
enabled identification of the overarching domains of concern.
These concerns were then converted into “best practice”
principles for effective incident disclosure. This conversion
involved, first, using patients’ and family members’ experiences
of inadequate incident disclosure as the basis for articulating
principles for appropriate disclosure communication. Second,
this conversion was complemented with principles formulated
from patients’ and family members’ affirmative experiences
and suggestions for improvement.
Ethical approval
Human research ethical approval was obtained from the
universities that were part of the project consortium and from
the health services involved in the study relevant to the particular
method of participant recruitment. The consortium’s lead
university’s approval code is UTSHREC 2008/300. Participants
had signed and sent in their informed consent sheets before their
interview took place.
Results
Overarching concerns
All patient and family member interviewees except one
expressed concerns about the process of incident disclosure.
Overarching concerns were (a) inadequate preparation for open
disclosure, (b) inappropriate disclosure of unexpected outcomes,
(c) lack of follow-up support, (d) lack of appropriate closure,
and (e) insufficient integration of open disclosure with
improvement of patient safety. Each of these concerns
encompassed ancillary issues. For example, inadequate
preparation for open disclosure encompassed institutions not
having a complaints mechanism that activates incident
disclosure, the disclosure process not being introduced with an
appropriate level of formality and explanation, and incidents
not being readily acknowledged to the patient and family. The
last issue was evidenced by interviewee statements such as:
“What they should have done was nip any possible complaint
in the bud by knocking on the door, ringing us up, and saying,
‘Come on in, this is what we want to talk about’” (husband,
005).
Boxes 1 to 5 present the ancillary issues of each of the
overarching concerns with representative interview quotes
illustrating the issues, and the principles of effective disclosure
that can be derived from the issues.
Ancillary issues
See boxes 1–5 for a complete list of ancillary issues. Many
interview participants reported having to request or demand
incident disclosure from the health service. Having to do so was
viewed as a poor start to disclosure, particularly when an
incident was not readily acknowledged by the treating clinician:
“We wanted a meeting, and I especially wanted our [specialist
doctor] there because I wanted them all to hear what they had
done to me” (mother, 039).
A delayed response from the service motivated some patients
and relatives to escalate their request for disclosure. Some
mobilised their general practitioner for this purpose: “After a
week, ten days, the three of us decided that we wanted to see
the notes, we…wanted to see more, we wanted to know if [son]
knew what was going to happen to him ... I rang up the GP, his
GP, and umm, which I knew and I said, ‘What do I have to do,
what is the procedure I have to go through to see the notes? I
want to know what happened on Wednesday night. I want to
see what the nurse put down.’ So he said, ‘You have to sign for
me that you give me the permission, and I’ll do the rest.’ It took
him ten days and then he called me” (mother, 009).
Others felt obliged to lodge a complaint, (threaten to) involve
the media, or initiate litigation to be granted disclosure. In cases
where disclosure was offered, it was often experienced as
inadequate. Interviewees felt the disclosure lacked open
dialogue, a consistent and trustful attitude on the part of the
treating clinicians, a sincere apology, a patient care plan seeking
to redress the harm, and clarification of how future incidents
would be prevented. The absence of open dialogue was felt to
deny patients and family members a say in the questions that
should have been asked and of whom, and in deciding whether
the explanations that were offered were sufficient and
satisfactory: “We want to know what happened that day. Why
was she moved from the room? … That could’ve contributed
to her disorientation … They said, ‘Oh well, we can’t really
give you that information’” (daughter, 020).
Interviewees felt disclosure was compromised when clinicians
expected them to accept formal investigation findings as
evidence that the failure had been addressed. Problems referred
to here included the investigation or findings of the “root cause
analysis” being framed in systems discourse rather than
addressing patients’ and family members’ low level concerns
(such as “Why did the nurse move mother from her room?”)
and clinical staff expecting to reach closure on the formal
investigation before providing the patient or family with answers
to their questions, or outlining plans for clinical process
improvement (see boxes 1–5): “There has been no follow-up.
No one has come to us or written to us. And as far as I’m
concerned there has to be a finalisation of everything. And this
is not final” (daughter, 004).
Principles for effective incident disclosure
The breadth of this study justified conversion of the concerns
and ancillary issues identified into principles for effective
incident disclosure. These principles were formulated as action
statements aiming to support and improve existing disclosure
procedures. The full list of the principles are in boxes 1–5. In
broad outline, they include:
• If clinicians and services are to meet patients’ and relatives’
expectations, they prepare all concerned for the incident
disclosure meeting(s)
• They investigate and agree on what went wrong and inform
those harmed of the need for a discussion about the
unexpected outcome
• Clinicians point out that the disclosure discussion(s) will
benefit from a patient support person being present, and
from those harmed presenting their own account, views,
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Box 1: Concerns about disclosure of healthcare incidents expressed by affected patients and family members
and inferred principles of effective disclosure: preparation for open disclosure
Incidents were not readily acknowledged to the patient or family
“What they should have done was nip any possible complaint in the bud by knocking on the door, ringing us up, and
saying, ‘Come on in, this is what we want to talk about, are there any more questions?’ yes there are, ‘Hit us with it.
OK, we’ll go out and get the answers, we’ll go back and talk to you’”—husband, 005
Best practice principle—Staff involved in a healthcare incident make sure to acknowledge the incident to the patient
within 48 hours, signalling the need for open disclosure
Institutions did not have an internal complaints mechanism that activated incident disclosure in the interest of the patient
“I got totally ticked off, and I thought I’m not getting anywhere by letters, so I rang them and said I wanted to have an
appointment face to face. Which I did”—patient, 006
Best practice principle—In cases where notification of the healthcare incident is absent or does not trigger open
disclosure, the patient has access to an internal complaints mechanism that activates open disclosure
The disclosure process was not introduced with the appropriate level of explanation and formality
“She called me … weeks after. I said, ‘Excuse me, who are you, where are you coming from?’ You don’t expect, when
you finish everything, that suddenly the hospital will call you and say, ‘Hi [name], I’m really sorry, we’re going to investigate
the matter’”—mother, 009
Best practice principle—Staff take care to communicate information relating to an incident with an appropriate level of
formality and sensitivity
Patients and family were not adequately informed about the process of open disclosure
“We got the open disclosure letter, saying they had an open disclosure policy, and they were quite happy to discuss
what had happened … which was good, because we needed that”—mother, 010
Best practice principle—The patient is given information about open disclosure in a language he or she understands,
explaining the purpose and processes of open disclosure
Open disclosure was arranged to take place at times and in locations that were unsuitable for the patient or family
“It needs to be very clear to people that you have the right to say, ‘Not now’”—daughter, 015
“That’s what it was like, going to school and going to the headmaster’s office, that’s what it felt like … Even if it was at
the other hospital, somewhere totally away from the clinic maybe”—mother, 003
Best practice principle—The timing and location of the first face to face open disclosure meeting are decided in dialogue
with the patient
Patients were not informed about the possibility of arranging for a personal support person
“Probably if we had … some … support people, that would have made it less clinical. Can I say, we probably would
have benefited [and] I personally would have benefited greatly from having some contact with some support … just
somebody to support us through that time”—patient, 013
Best practice principle—The patient nominates their open disclosure support person, who represents their interests (a
family member, a friend, a representative from an external agency, or, if considered appropriate, a health service
professional such as the patient’s general practitioner)
Open disclosure meetings were organised without patients and family members having a say in which staff members would
be present
“I really think the doctor in charge of my mum’s care should have been there … just to know what she was thinking,
you know … just to know what was going through her mind”—daughter, 001
Best practice principle—The patient is consulted about which healthcare workers are to be invited to the open disclosure
meeting(s)
and questions about what went wrong and what needs to
happen
• The disclosure discussion is performed as a two way,
exploratory dialogue that produces an explanation that
satisfies all stakeholders, bolstered by a sincere apology,
a care plan redressing the patient’s harm, a strategy for
preventing the incident from recurring, and a clear outline
of whether, why, and how other agencies (such as a
neighbouring health service or hospital, the police, or the
coroner) are involved
• Closure becomes feasible when the patient and family
members feel they have asked everything they wanted to
ask, have received adequate answers to their questions, and
are satisfied that their concerns have been taken seriously
• To reassure them that incident disclosure links to practice
improvement, they are informed about how the service has
addressed the incident and what difference this has made
or is making to care outcomes.
Discussion
This study was conducted against a backdrop of a decade of
development of disclosure policy, a nationwide disclosure pilot
programme (2006–8), ministerial endorsement of open
disclosure policy in 2008, and continued training in disclosure
communication within health services. However, our study
found that patients and family members only rarely experienced
incident disclosure communication as appropriate and effective.
Analysis yielded five overarching concerns, each encompassing
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ancillary issues, ranging from how disclosure was arranged and
communicated to how disclosure incorporated discussion of
practice change and improved outcomes. The importance of
these findings and strength of the analysis derive from the
study’s approach and method—recording and closely analysing
patients’ and family members’ in depth accounts shared with
independent researchers and in people’s own homes, affording
frank expression of experiences and views.
Implications of study results
Taken together, the article’s findings, analysis, and principles
make three important contributions to the theory and practice
of incident management and disclosure. Firstly, despite ethics
advocacy22 and evidence that disclosure need not exacerbate
financial and legal risk,23 24 the push for appropriate and effective
disclosure is yet to translate into improved outcomes for patients
and family members. Hearing first hand from 39 patients and
80 family members about current incident disclosure practices
constitutes the most compelling evidence to date that healthcare
institutions and providers should redouble efforts to enhance
clinician and support staff disclosure skills.
Secondly, the article’s analysis highlights patients’ and families’
expectation that disclosure should not be a one-way flow of
information. Study participants expected incident disclosure to
be a patient centred, respectful, and responsive dialogue to
promote healing, learning, and safety. In advocating exploratory
dialogue when things go wrong, the article highlights the
importance to patients and family members of being engaged
in a conversation that includes discussion of their questions and
views on how to regain acceptable levels of patient safety.5 25
Thirdly, patients’ and families’ accounts yielded practical
suggestions that can guide improvement in disclosure because
their enactment is identifiable in practice and measurable in
principle. Their identification in practice is made possible by
being formulated as specific actions, such as “The patient is
told the name and role of everyone attending the meeting.” In
turn, because these action principles are observable, they are
measurable: “Patients were informed and given documentation
every time about who attended the meeting and what their roles
were.” These principles enable services and organisations to
evaluate and track their own disclosure performance and
improvement.
Limitations of study
This study has some limitations. Firstly, the 100 incidents
sample represents a small number of the total number of serious
incidents that occurs every year.26 We sent out a nationwide
invitation and do not know why more people did not volunteer
for the study. Our lack of epidemiological knowledge about
healthcare incidents, however, means that determining an
appropriate sample size continues to be difficult.
Secondly, the three pronged recruitment strategy sought to
balance incidents selected by the health service with incidents
that members of the public volunteered to talk about. We cannot
confirm that this strategy indeed compensated for sample bias
because we do not know whether those who were aware of the
study but not interested in discussing their experience were
satisfied because of an effective incident disclosure, still too
traumatised by the incident, or still too upset after an
unsuccessful disclosure.
Questions remaining
Health services’ local practices and circumstances will constrain
how the principles of incident disclosure are enacted.
Clarification is needed about how resources and skills required
for doing disclosure well can be best made available and what
penetration of training is desirable given a service’s
geo-demographic catchment.
Another question is how incident disclosure can be made
culturally sensitive and relevant. This is critical for two reasons.
First, many health services are experiencing the effects of rising
patient and clinical staff migration. Second, culturally and
linguistically diverse background patients may have lower health
literacy and experience more difficulties accessing appropriate
care27 and may therefore also experience more incidents.
A third question relates to how early in their relationship with
the health service do patients need to be alerted to what
processes are initiated when things go wrong, and in what detail.
Earlier and more careful consideration by all stakeholders of
the possibility of things going wrong may alleviate tensions
when it comes to having difficult conversations.
Finally, practice improvement processes may be able to target,
besides organisational and clinical processes, the performance
and outcomes of incident disclosure processes. Here too an
important question remains about the trade-off between investing
in clinical improvement and strengthening service recovery
preparedness.
Conclusion
Health service policy, public advocacy, and research have
supported clinicians and services becoming more open about
healthcare incidents.1 2 4 5 25 How patients and their families
experience disclosure plays an important role in determining
the success of these initiatives. Does incident disclosure meet
patients’ and family members’ expectations? Does it restore
their faith in clinical safety and professionalism? If it does not,
how do they think incident disclosure needs to be improved?
By analysing patients’ and family members’ views and
experiences, we have taken a step towards answering these
critical questions. The principles produced from our analysis
will enable practitioners and services to alleviate unintended
harm with incident disclosure that is appropriate and patient
centred.
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Tables
Table 1| Recruitment methods and inclusion criteria for patients and family members whowere involved in high severity healthcare incidents
Inclusion criteriaRecruitment method
Documentation of patient experience of healthcare incident in Australian hospital in 2008–10Health service where the incident occurred
Incident judged to be severe to very severe (involving temporary or permanent harm or death)
Patient or family member involved in open disclosure discussions
Timing of the incident was 2008–10
Seriousness of incident perceived by patient or family to be high to very high
Patient or family were granted or demanded a meeting about the incident with health service
National print media
Market research company (internet)
Consumer organisation
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Table 2| Numbers of participants and interviews conducted by recruitment method among patients and family members who were involved
in high severity healthcare incidents
No of interviewsNo of participantsRecruitment method
2836Health service where the incident occurred
4356National print media
2727Market research company (internet)
22Consumer organisation
100121Total
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Figures
Fig 1 Age ranges of the patients discussed in interviews about high severity healthcare incidents
Fig 2 Number of interview participants (patients and family members involved in high severity healthcare incidents) by
Australian state
Fig 3 Numbers of high severity healthcare incidents discussed by clinical subject
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Box 3: Concerns about disclosure of healthcare incidents expressed by affected patients and family members
and inferred principles of effective disclosure: Providing follow-up support
Incident disclosure was reduced to a single meeting
“The patient representative did make the point that if we wanted another meeting, we could request another meeting
… Sometimes you come away and say, ‘Oh, why didn’t I ask such and such’”—son, 008
Best practice principle—If required or requested by the patient, open disclosure constitutes more than a single meeting,
and meetings can be requested at any point in the future
Patients and family members experienced problems accessing clinical information relevant to their own case
“I thought, as her next of kin and as the executor, I could just walk up and get her files and show them to my doctor …
because my brothers and sisters were so angry about the whole thing, and I wanted someone to explain it to us in our
terms, and they said, ‘No no because of the system or whatever we can’t do that, we can’t release them’”—daughter,
001
Best practice principle—Without contravening legal constraints, information requested by the patient is readily provided
and with utmost clarity
Patients and family members were not involved in the investigation or in discussion of investigation findings
“I actually got to ask, and they answered … because [health service staff] only look at a medical reason. You only look
for medical [things]. You don’t look for the actual facts around and what led to it. You only look at what it is when you
walked into that room, what you saw, or what you had to treat. You don’t look at okay, what happened before you got
to that room. … It’s only through them understanding the full story … [that] you can only bring about change”—wife,
053
Best practice principle—The patient and family need to have the opportunity to ask questions of and provide feedback
into the incident investigation process
Staff did not ensure a patient was looked after by the same staff member throughout the whole disclosure process
“I don’t know who to talk to, if they’d be willing to talk to us, so… yeah I don’t know, you’d think that … after that meeting
somebody would have contacted us”—daughter, 004
Best practice principle—A stable contact person represents the service, acting as an ongoing point of access, providing
information and support, and managing the open disclosure to its completion
Box 4: Concerns about disclosure of healthcare incidents expressed by affected patients and family members
and inferred principles of effective disclosure: Moving forward (towards closure)
Patients and family members were not asked whether they were ready for closure
“We’re all starting to move on, the best way we can. We’ll always have our memories of them, but, yes. I think within
the 12 months. I don’t, I wouldn’t drag it out any more”—mother, 010
Best practice principle—Closure of the open disclosure process occurs by shared agreement between the patient and
staff
At closure of the case, patients and family members were not given a record of what was disclosed, what explanations
were offered, what plans were put in place, and what improvements were going to be pursued
“You need to make sure that people walk away feeling that they’ve been heard, for closure. Everyone deserves that.
… You must have documentation of that all the way. Because people are emotional, and sometimes they might need
to see something in writing and in their own time and space read something”—daughter, 015
Best practice principle—At completion of the open disclosure process, all information requested by the patient and
available from the investigation is provided to the patient in an appropriately worded and accessible record
When there was disagreement about an incident after disclosure, patients and family members were not informed about
alternative courses of action open to them, such as filing a complaint or litigation
“If by August, September that review is not on the table then, you know, you have to go further and put a bit more
pressure on. … Maybe a threatening letter from a solicitor might move them on a bit … then all the paperwork has to
come up … but … it’s just a threat”—patient, 002
Best practice principle—In the event that no progress is evident, or no satisfactory conclusion is reached or cannot be
negotiated, alternate courses of action (complaint or legal action) are open to the patient
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Box 5: Concerns about disclosure of healthcare incidents expressed by affected patients and family members
and inferred principles of effective disclosure: Integrating incident disclosure with practice improvement
Incidents were not recorded and investigated as expected by patients and family members
“What I said to them was that the entire investigation has totally missed the point of my concerns and, instead of
addressing them, they tried to cover the hospital’s position from a legal viewpoint, and that was basically the last thing
I had on my mind”—patient, 006
Best practice principle—Staff ensure the incident is reported, recorded, and investigated in line with health service
policy
The medical record was not up to date, slowing down the investigation and disclosure and leading to disagreements about
what happened and what was done
“For example … there is a note [in the medical record] that says, ‘3am patient feels worse Endo Registrar contacted
and Cortisone given.’ And it makes it sound like it was an immediate thing, and it wasn’t; there is no mention of the
other five times she was called into my room. ... There is nothing there. … So it covers them legally as well, ‘No we
didn’t do anything wrong’”—patient, 006
Best practice principle—The medical record is up to date before the first meeting, including a comprehensive account
of the adverse event as it is understood. In the case of death due to the incident, a copy of the medical record is
accessible to all those who will be involved in the open disclosure process
Open disclosure was not regarded as being able to inform learning or bring about improvement
“I think it’s more important to have an atmosphere of openness and frankness and that, hopefully, at the end of the
day, the participants on both sides, the doctors as well, they’re forced to closely review what’s happened and their own
conduct, etc, and that they go away learning something as well. If that happens, that’s about the best you can expect
I think”—son, 008
Best practice principle—Open disclosure acts as a feedback process that promotes learning and practice improvement
in the context of just culture. This rules out blame unless the incident resulted from blatant misconduct
Patients were not involved in practice improvement even when they had crucial information about an incident
“I could have had counselling until the cows come home, but it would not have had the same effect as talking to those
people about improving the way they transport babies”—mother, 042
Best practice principle—The health service and hospital explore ways of involving the patient in practice improvement
initiatives
Staff were not well supported by colleagues within their own organisation, limiting their acceptance of and the effectiveness
of incident disclosure.
“I got this letter from the [professional] board that said that they were going to have a disciplinary hearing for the [junior
clinician]. I rang up the board and asked why, and what they were going to do. They basically said that the junior
[clinician], her mistakes rose to the level of where it was quite possible that she’d lose her practising licence. … I didn’t
really think that was fair. She [the junior clinician] told me that it was the first week on the ward, and yet she’d done a
silly thing [causing harm] … but she wasn’t being supervised, that was clear. … The way she talked to me, she was
unsure about things. I just didn’t believe that somebody placed in that situation should deserve to lose their entire
career, regardless of the fact that she basically stuffed up my life for a while, and [I] asked the [professional] board to
be able to come and give evidence. I went to the board and explained to them the events as I was aware of it”—patient,
050
Best practice principle—The patient engages in open disclosure with clinicians who themselves are supported by their
colleagues, managers, and organisation, both personally (emotionally) and professionally (appropriate training,
preparation, and debrief)
Organisations did not evaluate their incident disclosure processes for the purpose of improving disclosure communication
“At the end of the day, you know, when an unfortunate accident happens like that, that [inappropriate disclosure
communication] could be avoided in the future. … It would be good to know that my dad’s death, you know, sort of
prompted some changes in that area, you know, and I’m sure that if he was around, he would like to know that as
well—daughter, 007
Best practice principle—At the conclusion of open disclosure, the patient and staff are surveyed to ascertain their
satisfaction with the process as part of an open disclosure improvement process
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What is already known on this topic
Patients and family members expect open and early admission that a serious incident has occurred, an apology, an
explanation of its causes and its consequences for them, and a plan to avoid similar incidents in the future
Patients’ expectations are often not met, and patients tend to regard incidents as more serious and in need of more
open communication than do clinicians
What this study adds
The prominence of open disclosure policy and training in incident disclosure have not yet significantly improved incident
disclosure outcomes for patients and family members: communication about serious incidents rarely met the expectations
of 39 patients and 80 family members, compounding their distress
Analytical findings converted into a comprehensive set of principles for effective incident disclosure derived from the
findings could guide healthcare organisations in improving incident disclosure
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